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 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Jones 
v. City of Los Angeles that a city ordinance criminalizing sitting, lying, or 
sleeping on public streets and sidewalks—in all places and at all times—
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.1 The court recognized that people must sit, lie, and sleep at some 
                                                 
* City attorney & municipal prosecutor, Walla Walla, Washington, 1996–present; J.D., 
Gonzaga University School of Law, 1987; B.A., Whitman College, 1984. The author 
thanks Jim Barrow, Barbara Clark, Gerald “Jerry” Cummins, Dominick Elia, and Fred 
Mitchell. 
1 Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1131–38 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 
1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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point each day.2 The court concluded that a 24/7 ban against sitting, lying, 
and sleeping in public areas violates the rights of homeless persons when 
other alternatives are unavailable because individuals in such unfortunate 
circumstances are unable to entirely avoid engaging in those innocent 
activities.3 
 The Ninth Circuit later vacated Jones after the parties settled, and Los 
Angeles agreed that its ordinance would not be enforced during nighttime 
hours.4 Jones was nonetheless subsequently utilized by lower courts as 
guidance when analyzing ordinances targeted at subsistence activities 
regularly performed by homeless persons in public places.5 The United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) argued in 2015 that Jones provides the 
appropriate legal framework for analyzing Eighth Amendment claims.6 It 
asserted that half a million people are likely to experience homelessness on 
any given night.7 The DOJ further reported, based upon an annual homeless 
assessment report generated by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, that 42% of homeless persons slept in unsheltered public 
locations in 2014.8 The DOJ maintained that the logic of Jones “remains 
instructive and persuasive,”9 and it took the position “that criminalizing 
sleeping in public when no shelter is available violates the Eighth 
Amendment by criminalizing status.”10 
 The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed its adherence to the Jones 
framework in Martin v. City of Boise.11 The appellate panel in Martin 
                                                 
2 Id. at 1136; see also In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“Sleep 
is a physiological need, not an option for humans.”). 
3 Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136–37. 
4 Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Jones v. City of Los 
Angeles, 555 F. App’x. 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the court vacated and 
withdrew its opinion in Jones "only after the parties entered a settlement agreement 
suspending the nighttime enforcement" of the Los Angeles ordinance). 
5 E.g., Cobine v. City of Eureka, 250 F. Supp. 3d 423, 431 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Bell v. City of 
Boise, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107 (D. Idaho 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 709 F.3d 890 
(9th Cir. 2013); State v. Adams, 91 So. 3d 724, 745–54 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); contra, 
e.g., Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1231–34 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 
(choosing to adopt the reasoning of the dissent in Jones rather than its majority's rationale). 
6 Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, 10, 16, Bell v. Boise 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103 
(D. Idaho 2011) (No. 1:09-cv-540-REB).  
7 Id. at 2.  
8 Id.  
9 Id. at 10.  
10 Id. at 9–10.  
11 Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035–36, 1046 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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recognized the Jones decision was not binding but wrote that it agreed “with 
Jones’s reasoning and central conclusion.”12 The panel held “that an 
ordinance violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it imposes criminal 
sanctions against homeless individuals for sleeping outdoors, on public 
property, when no alternative shelter is available to them.”13 It explained: 
Like the Jones panel, “we in no way dictate to the City that it 
must provide sufficient shelter for the homeless, or allow 
anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the streets . . . at any 
time and at any place.” We hold only that “so long as there is 
a greater number of homeless individuals in [a jurisdiction] 
than the number of available beds [in shelters],” the 
jurisdiction cannot prosecute homeless individuals for 
“involuntarily sitting, lying, and sleeping in public.”   That is, 
as long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the 
government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for 
sleeping outdoors, on public property, on the false premise 
they had a choice in the matter.14 
 This Article examines the extent to which the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects the ability of 
homeless persons to subsist in public places. It reviews the origins and history 
of the clause and how it has been applied to test the constitutionality of local 
laws targeted at the homeless. It further discusses whether homelessness 
constitutes a recognizable status protected by the Eighth Amendment, and, if 
so, whether protection is extended to unavoidable conduct resulting from that 
status. Lastly, this Article examines the circumstances under which 
subsistence activities performed in public by homeless persons may be 
considered unavoidable and thereby protected by the Cruel and Unusual 




                                                 
12 Id. at 1035. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 1048 (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 
1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS 
CLAUSE. 
 The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is derived from a 1689 
act of the British Parliament.15 The Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”16 That 
act adopted a bill of rights in response to abuses committed during the reign 
of James II.17 Among other enumerated rights, the 1689 act declared “that 
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”18 The 1776 Virginia Declaration of 
Rights adopted an identical provision.19  “The Eighth Amendment was based 
directly on Art. I, § 9, of the Virginia Declaration of Rights . . . .”20 
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally believed 
to be directed at prohibiting certain methods of punishment.21 The General 
Court of Virginia explained with respect to the provision contained in the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights that it “was never designed to control the 
Legislative right to determine ad libitum [at pleasure] upon the adequacy of 
punishment, but is merely applicable to the modes of punishment.”22 The 
United States Supreme Court similarly concluded in the case of In re 
Kemmler that the punishment of crime is almost wholly confided in the 
legislative branch of government, and the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment operates as a limitation upon the types of punishment 
                                                 
15 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also 3 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 750 (Hilliard, 
Gray, and Company, 1833). 
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
17 See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 130 (Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) (1825); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. 29, at 723 (WM. Hardcastle ed. 
1892)(1769); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The 
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 852–60 (1969). 
18 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of 
the Crown 1689 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 41, 43 (1971) (modernizing the spelling of terms 
contained in England’s Official Bill of Rights). 
19 See VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. I, § 9. 
20 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10 (1983). 
21 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–70 (1976); Granucci, supra note 17, at 839–42. 
22 Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447, 449–50 (Gen. Ct. 1824). 
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that may be imposed.23 “So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offence 
. . . were manifestly cruel and unusual as burning at the stake, crucifixion[,] 
breaking on the wheel, or the like, it would be the duty of the courts to 
adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition.”24 
 The Supreme Court began to broaden its view of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause at the end of the 19th century. The majority in 
O’Neil v. Vermont rejected a challenge to a conditional sentence of 19,914 
days imprisonment imposed for unlawful sale of liquor on the basis that 
federal error had not been assigned, and because the Eighth Amendment was 
not at that time applied to the states.25 Justice Field wrote in dissent that this 
sentence of more than 54 years seemed unusual and cruel in its severity when 
considering the offenses for which it was imposed.26 He reasoned that the 
inhibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not only directed against 
atrocious punishments like the rack, thumbscrew, and iron boot, “but against 
all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly 
disproportioned to the offences charged.”27 Writing for himself and Justice 
Brewer, the first Justice Harlan agreed that confinement for “54 years and 
204 days, inflicts punishment, which, in view of the character of the offences 
committed, must be deemed cruel and unusual.”28 
 Justice Field’s position in O’Neil later became the prevailing view in 
Weems v. United States, where the Supreme Court struck a criminal sentence 
by measuring the disproportionality of punishment against the crime 
charged.29 The Court acknowledged the origins of the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments, but it explained that “a principle, to be vital, 
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”30 
It expanded the scope of the prohibition beyond methods of punishment, 
                                                 
23 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446–47 (1890). 
24 Id. at 446; see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION 329–30 (Little, Brown and Company 3d ed., 1874). 
25 O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1892). 
26 Id. at 338–41, 364–65 (Field, J., dissenting). 
27 Id. at 339–40. 
28 Id. at 371 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
29 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380–81 (1910).  Weems applied a prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishments found in the Philippine bill of rights, which the 
Court explained “was taken from the Constitution of the United States, and must have the 
same meaning.”  Id. at 367. 
30 Id. at 373. 
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rhetorically asking, “[w]ith power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to 
give criminal character to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix 
terms of imprisonment with what accompaniments they might, what more 
potent instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power?”31 It thus 
held that, although the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause arose from the 
experience of certain evils, its general language should not “be necessarily 
confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken.”32 
 The Court proceeded to compare the sentence in that case to sentences 
that might be handed out for similar and more serious crimes.33 It found that 
the disproportionality of the penalty established for the crime at issue in 
Weems (when contrasted against other penalties) showed more than 
“different exercises of legislative judgment,” and, instead, exhibited the 
“difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under the 
spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice.”34 By requiring 
comparative proportionality, the Weems Court concluded that “[t]he purpose 
of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not 
tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the 
reformation of the criminal.”35 
 Justice Edward White dissented in Weems because logical future 
application of the majority’s expansion of the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment beyond methods of punishment to “the degree of severity 
with which authorized modes of punishment may be inflicted” could 
completely divest the legislative branch of government of its legitimate 
independent power to define and punish crime.36 The dissent complained that 
statements made by the majority imposing a legislative duty to shape 
legislation with a view to reform and punish a criminal conferred power upon 
courts to refuse to enforce laws defining and punishing crimes if they are not, 
in a court’s opinion, properly motivated.37 
 Justice White opined that the ban against cruel punishment forbids 
criminal penalties that inflict “unnecessary bodily suffering through a resort 
                                                 
31 Id. at 372–73. 
32 Id. at 373. 
33 Id. at 381. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 388 (White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 397–98, 410–11. 
37 Id. at 386–88. 
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to inhuman methods for causing bodily torture . . . .”38 He further wrote that 
the proscription of unusual punishment forbids courts from inflicting lawful 
modes of punishment in an unusual manner and legislatures from conferring 
such power to the courts.39 Justice White disputed the majority’s assertion 
that the vitality of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause could be 
ensured only by expanding its scope beyond methods of punishment.40 He 
agreed that the clause is not limited to historically decried practices and, 
instead, “being generic, embraces all methods within its intendment.”41 
Therefore, “if it could be conceived that to-morrow the lawmaking power, 
instead of providing for the infliction of the death penalty by hanging, should 
command its infliction by burying alive, who could doubt that the law would 
be repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against cruel punishment?”42 In 
his view this did not, however, warrant expanding “the judicial power by 
endowing it with a vast authority to control the legislative department in the 
exercise of its discretion to define and punish crime.”43 
 Many decades after deciding Weems, the Supreme Court again 
expanded the reach of the Eighth Amendment in Robinson v. California.44 
Robinson struck a statute that had been construed as criminalizing a person’s 
“status” or “chronic condition” of being a drug addict.45  The Court 
recognized that a state might validly regulate by imposing criminal sanctions 
“against the unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or 
possession of narcotics within its borders.”46 It further noted that a state could 
establish compulsory treatment programs for addicts that might require 
periods of involuntary confinement and penal sanctions for failure to comply 
with such programs.47 However, the Court categorized drug addiction among 
other illnesses48 and opined that “a law which made a criminal offense of 
such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of 
                                                 
38 Id. at 409. 
39 Id. at 409–10. 
40 Id. at 410–11. 
41 Id. at 410. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 411. 
44 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
45 Id. at 665–67. 
46 Id. at 664. 
47 Id. at 664–65. 
48 Id. at 666–67. 
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cruel and unusual punishment . . . .”49 It concluded that “[e]ven one day in 
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a 
common cold.”50 
 Justice Byron White dissented, writing that he deemed the majority’s 
“application of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ so novel” that he suspected 
“the Court was hard put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of the 
Constitution the result reached today rather than to its own notions of ordered 
liberty.”51 He wrote that he might have other thoughts if a conviction rested 
upon sheer status.52 However, Justice White maintained that someone could 
not be convicted of being an addict without proof of regular use of narcotics 
and opined that a state possesses the power to punish such use.53 Justice Clark 
wrote in dissent that “[i]t is no answer to suggest that we are dealing with an 
involuntary status and thus penal sanctions will be ineffective and unfair.”54 
He asserted that a state should not be powerless to deter persons who 
purchase, possess, and use narcotics from becoming addicts.55 Justice Clark 
noted that the majority recognized the authority of a state to punish the actions 
by which addicts became addicted and opined that such resulting volitional 
addiction should be treated no differently.56 In addition, he wrote that 
“‘status’ offenses have long been known and recognized in the criminal 
law.”57 
 The Supreme Court later discussed Robinson at length in Powell v. 
Texas, but it could not reach a majority opinion upon how to apply it.58 A 
plurality upheld the conviction of a person for being intoxicated in a public 
place.59 Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for himself and three other justices 
that Robinson did not apply because the statute at issue did not seek to punish 
mere status.60 It instead imposed “a criminal sanction for public behavior 
                                                 
49 Id. at 666. 
50 Id. at 667. 
51 Id. at 689 (White, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. at 685. 
53 Id. at 686–88. 
54 Id. at 684 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
55 Id. at 683. 
56 Id. at 683–84. 
57 Id. at 684 (Clark, J., dissenting); see generally Forrest W. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other 
Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1203 (1953). 
58 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
59 See id. at 516–37 (Marshall, J.); Id. at 537–48 (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 548–54 
(White, J., concurring in result). 
60 Id. at 532–534 (Marshall, J.).  
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which may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for appellant 
and for members of the general public, and which offends the moral and 
esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the community.”61 He further 
commented that “unless Robinson is so viewed it is difficult to see any 
limiting principle that would serve to prevent this Court from becoming, 
under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate 
arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility, in diverse areas of criminal 
law, throughout the country.”62 
 Justice Fortas took a different view and wrote in dissent for himself 
and three other justices that Robinson stands on a principle that “[c]riminal 
penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is 
powerless to change.”63 He noted that the statute at issue in Powell differed 
from the one at issue in Robinson since it punished a condition coupled with 
an act: being intoxicated and being found in such condition in a public 
place.64  In other words, “[t]he statute covers more than a mere status.”65 
However, the dissent found this difference immaterial, asserting that “the 
essential constitutional defect here is the same as in Robinson, for in both 
cases the particular defendant was accused of being in a condition which he 
had no capacity to change or avoid.”66 
 The Marshall plurality in Powell found the dissent’s interpretation of 
Robinson troubling because it would extend the Eighth Amendment to 
establish a “constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility.”67 It asserted 
that the dissent’s logic would have no limitation.68 It insisted the same logic 
that excuses a chronic alcoholic from criminal responsibility for involuntary 
conduct caused by that disease could be used to excuse a murderer afflicted 
with a compulsion to kill.69 The Marshall plurality wrote that “as the dissent 
acknowledges, there is a substantial definitional distinction between a 
‘status,’ as in Robinson, and a ‘condition,’ which is said to be involved in this 
case.”70 It argued that the dissent’s interpretation would convert Robinson 
                                                 
61 Id. at 532. 
62 Id. at 533. 
63 Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 567–68. 
67 Id. at 534 (Marshall, J.). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 533. 
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into a national standard for personal accountability that is contrary to 
traditional common law concepts and considerations of federalism.71 
 Justice Byron White disagreed with both the Marshall plurality and 
the dissent’s apparent preoccupation with labels.72 He wrote that a chronic 
alcoholic should not be shielded by a compulsion to drink if he or she 
knowingly fails to take precautions while sober against committing an act 
that has been criminalized.73 He also recognized, however, that some 
alcoholics do not have homes and “[f]or all practical purposes the public 
streets may be home for these unfortunates . . . .”74 Justice White posited that 
“[t]his is more a function of economic station than of disease, although the 
disease may lead to destitution and perpetuate that condition.”75 He 
concluded  that a statute punishing public drunkenness “is in effect a law 
which bans the single act for which they may not be convicted under the 
Eighth Amendment—the act of getting drunk.”76 He nonetheless concurred 
in the judgment affirming the conviction in Powell because the defendant 
“made no showing that he was unable to stay off the streets on the night in 
question.”77 
 The Supreme Court summarized its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
in Ingraham v. Wright.78 The Ingraham Court wrote that the framers of the 
Constitution “feared the imposition of torture and other cruel punishments 
not only by judges acting beyond their lawful authority, but also by 
legislatures engaged in making the laws by which judicial authority would be 
measured.”79 The Court reviewed earlier decisions upon whether a 
punishment is “cruel and unusual” and explained: 
[T]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause circumscribes 
the criminal process in three ways: First, it limits the kinds of 
punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes; 
second, it proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to 
the severity of the crime; and third, it imposes substantive 
limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such. We 
                                                 
71 Id. at 535–37. 
72 Id. at 550, n.2 (White, J., concurring in result). 
73 Id. at 550. 
74 Id. at 551. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 554. 
78 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664–67 (1977). 
79 Id. at 665. 
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have recognized the last limitation as one to be applied 
sparingly.80 
The third category mentioned in Ingraham originates from Robinson.81 
 The Ninth Circuit explained in Jones v. City of Los Angeles that the 
third protection enumerated in Ingraham “differs from the first two in that it 
limits what the state can criminalize, not how it can punish.”82 It held that 
Robinson, at a minimum, “establishes that the state may not criminalize 
‘being’; that is, the state may not punish a person for who he is, independent 
of anything he has done.”83 A majority in Jones discerned from the Fortas 
dissent and the White concurrence that a majority of the Supreme Court in 
Powell read Robinson as supporting the proposition the “state cannot punish 
a person for certain conditions, either arising from his own acts or contracted 
involuntarily, or acts that he is powerless to avoid.”84 The Jones court 
concluded from those principles that a city cannot “expressly criminalize the 
status of homelessness by making it a crime to be homeless without violating 
the Eight Amendment, nor can it criminalize acts that are an integral aspect 
of that status.”85 
 The Jones majority wrote that “Justice White and the Powell 
dissenters shared a common view of the importance of involuntariness to 
Eighth Amendment inquiry.”86 It posited that Justice White’s disagreement 
upon the meaning of Robinson deprived the Marshall plurality’s opinion of 
precedential value beyond the precise facts in Powell.87 The Jones majority 
recognized that Justice White and the Powell dissenters also did not fully 
agree, and it agreed with Justice White to the extent that his views differed 
from those of the dissenters.88 However, it found any disagreement between 
                                                 
80 Id. at 667 (citations omitted); see also Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1045 (9th 
Cir. 2018); but see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (Scalia, J.) 
(concluding for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist that “the Eighth Amendment contains 
no proportionality guarantee”). 
81 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667 (citing Robinson, 370 U.S. 660). 
82 Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 
1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
83 Id. at 1133. 
84 Id.; see also id. at 1135 (adopting an interpretation of Robinson upon which it 
determined that the dissenters and Justice White would agree in Powell). 
85 Id. at 1132. 
86 Id. at 1134. 
87 Id. at 1135. 
88 Id. (“We agree with Justice White that analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s substantive 
limits on criminalization ‘is not advanced by preoccupation with the label “condition”’.”); 
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Justice White and the Powell dissenters immaterial writing that, 
notwithstanding their differences, “five Justices in Powell understood 
Robinson to stand for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the 
unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.”89 The Jones majority 
asserted, based upon its reading of the opinions of Justice White and the 
dissenters in Powell, that there are two considerations that are relevant with 
respect to the limit placed upon the state’s power to criminalize by the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause.90 “The first is the distinction between pure 
status—the state of being—and pure conduct—the act of doing. The second 
is the distinction between an involuntary act or condition and a voluntary 
one.”91 
 The Jones court found that Los Angeles did not have sufficient shelter 
space to house all of its homeless.92 Many homeless, therefore, had no place 
to be other than on city sidewalks.93 It asserted that “[w]hether sitting, lying, 
and sleeping are defined as acts or conditions, they are universal and 
unavoidable consequences of being human.”94 The Jones court further 
explained that human beings cannot remain in a state of perpetual motion and 
must sit, lie, and sleep at some time during the day or night.95 It therefore 
concluded that “by criminalizing sitting, lying, and sleeping, the City is in 
fact criminalizing [the] status [of] homeless individuals.”96 
 The United States District Court for the District of Idaho in Bell v. 
City of Boise summarized its understanding of the majority holding in Jones 
as follows: 
First, the Court must determine whether the homeless have no 
choice but to be present in the City’s public spaces. This could 
be established either on the basis that there is insufficient 
shelter space or perhaps because, for at least a portion of the 
homeless population, the ‘‘chronic homeless,’’ living in a 
                                                 
see also id. at 1136 (stating that the Jones majority was guided by an admonition made by 
Justice White in Powell). 
89 Id. at 1135; see also Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2018). 
90 Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1122–23. 
93 Id. at 1123. 
94 Id. at 1136. 
95 See id. at 1136–37. 
96 Id. at 1137. 
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shelter is not a viable option.  Second, the Court must find that 
[the] enforcement of [a prohibition] effectively penalizes the 
homeless for simply being present or engaging in innocent 
activity, such as sleeping, that does not warrant punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment and, in effect, criminalizes the 
status of being homeless.97 
Circuit Judge Rymer dissented in Jones, writing that “[n]either the 
Supreme Court nor any other circuit court of appeals has ever held that 
conduct derivative of a status may not be criminalized.”98 She asserted that 
the majority improperly assembled the individual opinions in Powell into a 
result that not even the dissent would have reached.99 Judge Rymer explained 
that Powell dissenters said only that conduct closely related to status may not 
be punished if “the conduct is ‘a characteristic and involuntary part of the 
pattern of the [status] as it afflicts’ the particular individual. This is not the 
case with a homeless person who sometimes has shelter and sometimes 
doesn’t.”100 She further explained that no federal appellate court had until 
then “intimated (let alone held) that status plus a condition which exists on 
account of discretionary action by someone else is the kind of ‘involuntary’ 
condition that cannot be criminalized.”101 Judge Rymer warned that the 
decision of the Jones majority would, in effect, “immunize from criminal 
liability those who commit an act as a result of a condition that the 
government’s failure to provide a benefit has left them in.”102 
 Judge Rymer additionally criticized the Jones majority for accepting 
general facts about the status of homeless persons that Justice White’s 
concurrence in Powell would have insisted be specifically proven.103 She 
asserted that the Jones majority, without proof, assumed the condition of the 
persons who challenged the ordinance at issue.104 In summary, Judge Rymer 
complained that the Jones majority synthesized the concurring and dissent 
                                                 
97 Bell v. City of Boise, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108 (D. Idaho 2011), rev’d on other 
grounds, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Cobine v. City of Eureka, 250 F. Supp. 3d 
423, 431 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
98 Jones, 444 F.3d at 1139 (Rymer, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. 




103 Jones, 444 F.3d at 1146–47 (Rymer, J., dissenting); see generally Powell v. Texas, 392 
U.S. 514, 552–54 (1967) (White, J., concurring in result). 
104 Jones, 444 F.3d at 1147 (Rymer, J., dissenting). 
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opinions in Powell into a broad proposition expressly endorsed by neither,105 
all while ignoring that Ingraham subsequently reconfirmed the Marshall 
plurality’s determination in Powell that the Robinson principle has limited 
application.106 
 Judge Rymer noted that Ingraham referred to the Marshall plurality’s 
interpretation of Robinson in Powell when stating that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause should be “applied sparingly” when limiting legislative 
authority to define crimes.107 She wrote that it should be applied only in rare 
cases involving “an internal affliction, potentially an innocent or involuntary 
one.”108 She explained that homelessness in not an innate or immutable 
characteristic and is instead a transitory state into which some people fall and 
others opt.109 Judge Rymer wrote that “Robinson does not apply to 
criminalization of conduct.”110 Judge Rymer further wrote that it only applies 
to situations where a law makes a person continuously guilty of a crime 
without having actually done something where the offense was supposedly 
committed.111 She therefore reasoned that Robinson does not apply to the act 
of sleeping, sitting, or lying on a city street.112 
II. IS HOMELESSNESS A RECOGNIZABLE STATUS? 
 The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California held in Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco that 
homelessness is not a status.113 The court in Joyce wrote that “[d]epicting 
homelessness as ‘status’ is by no means self-evident . . . .”114 It explained that 
homelessness cannot be readily classified as a status.115 The court 
acknowledged that the concept of status is difficult to define, but it wrote that 
“certain factors assist in its determination, such as the involuntariness of the 
acquisition of that quality (including the presence or not of that characteristic 
at birth), and the degree to which an individual has control over that 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 See id. at 1139, 1144, 1149. 
107 Id. at 1144 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977)). 
108 Id. at 1146. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1145. 
111 Id. at 1146. 
112 Id. at 1145. 
113 Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 854–58 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
114 Id. at 856. 
115 Id. at 857. 
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characteristic.”116 The court in Joyce identified age, race, gender, national 
origin, and illness as examples that demonstrate the characteristics of 
status.117 It noted that the Robinson Court recognized drug addiction as a 
status by analogizing it to an illness or disease that might be involuntarily 
contracted.118 It did not, however, find homelessness directly analogous to a 
disease.119 The court explained: 
While homelessness can be thrust upon an unwitting recipient, 
and while a person may be largely incapable of changing that 
condition, the distinction between the ability to eliminate one's 
drug addiction as compared to one's homelessness is a 
distinction in kind as much as in degree. To argue that 
homelessness is a status and not a condition, moreover, is to 
deny the efficacy of acts of social intervention to change the 
condition of those currently homeless.120 
In the view of the court in Joyce, “status cannot be defined as a function of 
the discretionary acts of others.”121 
 The California Supreme Court endorsed, but did not expressly adopt, 
the Joyce analysis in Tobe v. City of Santa Ana.122 It refused to recognize 
homelessness as a status because the declarations submitted in that case by 
persons claiming to be homeless were “far from clear that none had 
alternatives to either the condition of being homeless or the conduct that led 
to homelessness . . . .”123 The California Court of Appeals subsequently 
explained in Allen v. City of Sacramento that “being homeless is not 
necessarily equivalent to an involuntary condition or status.”124 The Allen 
court noted that “no generalization can describe a diverse population,” and it 
rejected status claims because the homeless persons in that case alleged only 
that they had no shelter available but did not allege why they had no shelter.125 
                                                 
116 Id. (citations omitted). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 858. 
120 Id. at 857. 
121 Id.  
122 See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1166–67 (Cal. 1995). 
123 Id. at 1167. 
124 Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 59 (Ct. App. 2015). 
125 Id. 
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 The Jones majority disagreed with the analysis in Joyce.126 In its 
view, the involuntariness of the act or condition criminalized “is the critical 
factor delineating a constitutionally cognizable status, and incidental conduct 
which is integral to and an unavoidable result of that status, from acts or 
conditions that can be criminalized consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment.”127 The Jones majority largely skirted discussing whether 
homelessness qualifies as a status and instead focused upon the distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary acts and conditions.128 It found that single 
factor determinative.129 Without separately analyzing what constitutes status, 
the Jones majority concluded that homelessness is a status, writing that 
homeless individuals “are in a chronic state that may have been acquired 
‘innocently or involuntarily.’”130 
 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
similarly ruled in Pottinger v. City of Miami that “voluntariness of [a] status 
or condition is the decisive factor.”131  Based on the testimony of a number 
of expert witnesses, the court in Pottinger found that homeless persons 
“rarely choose to be homeless.”132 It recounted testimony that homeless 
persons share the characteristic of being socially isolated and having no one 
to take them in.133 The court also noted that experts identified many causes 
for homelessness, and that those causes are often exacerbated by factors that 
result from that homelessness.134 In summary, the court in Pottinger 
concluded that people “become homeless due to a variety of factors that are 
beyond their control,”135 and they do not choose to live under the conditions 
                                                 
126 Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 
1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 1132–36. 
129 See id. at 1137 (explaining that “an individual may become homeless based on factors 
both within and beyond his immediate control, especially in consideration of the 
composition of the homeless as a group: the mentally ill, addicts, victims of domestic 
violence, the unemployed, and the unemployable”). 
130  Id. at 1136; see also id. (writing that the Jones “dissent veers off track by attempting to 
isolate the supposed ‘criminal conduct’ from the status of being involuntarily homeless at 
night on the streets”). 
131 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1992), remanded for 
limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir.1994), and directed to undertake settlement 
discussions, 76 F.3d 1154 (1996). 
132 Id. at 1563. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1563–64. 
135 Id. at 1564. 
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attendant to homelessness, except in rare cases.136 
 Cases employing reasoning similar to Pottinger integrate the question 
of status into a more generalized inquiry into “being.”137 The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas opined in Johnson v. City of 
Dallas that the distinction drawn in Joyce  between status and acts does not 
appear to flow logically from Robinson.138 The court explained that “[i]t 
should be a foregone conclusion that maintaining human life requires certain 
acts, among them being the consuming of nourishment, breathing and 
sleeping.”139 It explained that many homeless persons have no choice but to 
perform those acts in public.140 The court in Johnson therefore concluded that 
prohibitions against performing those life sustaining activities in public 
impermissibly punish status because “the status of being could clearly not be 
criminalized under Robinson.”141 
 In Anderson v. City of Portland, the United States District Court for 
the District of Oregon departed from the reasoning of the Jones majority and 
Pottinger that voluntariness is the decisive factor in determining status.142 It 
explained that the nature of the prohibited conduct is an equally important 
factor.143 It noted that both the Marshall plurality in Powell and Judge 
Rymer’s dissent in Jones looked at the nature of a prohibited act to see if it 
involved something that created a substantial health or safety hazard or other 
conduct that society has an interest in preventing.144 The court in Anderson, 
therefore, concluded that Eighth Amendment analysis focuses upon whether 
an enactment criminalizes something that is both “involuntary and 
innocent.”145 
                                                 
136 Id. at 1563. 
137 See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he state 
may not criminalize ‘being’. . . .”), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. City 
of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (“Because being does not exist without 
sleeping, criminalizing the latter necessarily punishes the homeless for their status as 
homeless, a status forcing them to be in public.”), rev’d in part, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 
1995), and vacated in part, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Martin v. City of Boise, 
902 F.3d 1031, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2018) (adopting the reasoning of Jones). 
138 Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 349. 
139 Id. at 350. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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 Joyce and the Jones majority approach the issue of status from 
opposite directions.  Joyce treats the existence of status as a question that 
must be resolved first before addressing whether a prohibition penalizes 
status or conduct.146 The Jones majority instead starts with the penalized 
activity to determine whether it was voluntary and concludes that status has 
been unconstitutionally punished if the activity was unavoidable.147 The 
White concurrence and the dissent in Powell both find the issue of 
voluntariness important.148 However, nothing in Powell suggests that a 
majority of the justices would have skipped the threshold question of 
status.149 
 The Marshall plurality in Powell would not extend Robinson to cover 
conduct committed as a result of a condition,150 but it also would not assume 
status was at issue and roundly criticized the trial court’s finding that 
alcoholism is a disease, writing “the inescapable fact is that there is no 
agreement among members of the medical profession about what it means to 
say that ‘alcoholism’ is a ‘disease.’”151 The dissent disagreed but nonetheless 
found that “consideration of the Eighth Amendment issue in this case requires 
an understanding of ‘the disease of chronic alcoholism’ . . . .”152 Having found 
alcoholism to be a disease causing symptomatic compulsion that destroyed 
the affected person’s will power, the dissent concluded that the Eighth 
Amendment does not allow punishment of an alcoholic for a condition that 
person can no longer control.153 Both the Marshall plurality and the dissent 
place considerable emphasis upon the threshold question of status and 
whether alcoholism constitutes a disease.154 
                                                 
146 See Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857–58 (N.D. Cal. 
1994). 
147 Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1132–37 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
148 See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 n.2 (1968) (White, J., concurring in result) 
(“The proper subject of inquiry is whether volitional acts brought about the ‘condition’ and 
whether those acts a sufficiently proximate to the ‘condition’ for it to be permissible to 
impose penal sanctions on the ‘condition.’”); Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“Criminal 
penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to 
change.”). 
149 See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
150 See id. at 533–34 (Marshall, J.). 
151 Id. at 522. 
152 Id. at 559 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
153 Id. at 567–70. 
154 See id. at 559–65. 
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 Justice White’s analysis in Powell also does not appear to eliminate 
the threshold question of status.155 He opined that a person who claims he has 
been unconstitutionally punished for being a chronic alcoholic must both 
prove his disease and that the alcoholism created the compulsion to engage 
in the activity for which he has been penalized.156 Justice White wrote in 
Powell that Robinson dealt with the “‘status’ of narcotics addiction” which 
meant “a condition brought about by acts remote in time from the application 
of the criminal sanctions contemplated, a condition which was relatively 
permanent in duration, and a condition of great magnitude and significance 
in terms of human behavior and values.”157 He further explained that chronic 
alcoholism was the same, but the mere transitory state of being drunk was 
not.158 In contrast to chronic alcoholism, the condition of being merely drunk 
is (1) not far removed from the acts that caused the intoxication, (2) not a 
state of great duration, and (3) an isolated instance that has relatively slight 
importance in the life of the intoxicated person.159 
A. Supreme Court Guidance Upon Status. 
 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court would recognize 
homelessness as a status.  Neither Robinson, nor the Marshall plurality, nor 
the dissent in Powell provided an analytical framework for determining when 
something constitutes status, but it is noteworthy that all focused on whether 
the condition at issue was an illness or disease.160 Robinson addressed drug 
addiction.161  Powell involved alcoholism.162 It could therefore be maintained 
that the Robinson principle is limited to those types of settings involving 
ingrained human characteristics and internal afflictions.163 
 Justice White’s definition of status could encompass more than just 
                                                 
155 See, e.g., id. at 548–54 (White, J., concurring in result). 
156 Id. at 549–50. 
157 Id. at 550 n.2. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 517–26 (Marshall, J.); Id. at 559–65 (Fortas, J., dissenting); Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962). 
161 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. 
162 Powell, 392 U.S. at 517–26 (Marshall, J.); Id. at 549–50 (1967) (White, J., concurring in 
result); Id. at 559–65 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
163 See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rymer, J., 
dissenting); Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1231 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 2009); 
Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
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infirmities and ailments164 and might include chronic homelessness. Justice 
White expressly mentioned economic factors as a relevant consideration.165 
Justice Douglas later wrote (with citation to Robinson) in his dissent from the 
Supreme Court’s dismissal of certiorari in Hicks v. District of Columbia that 
he did “not see how economic or social status can be made a crime any more 
than being a drug addict can be.”166 Under Justice White’s formulation in 
Powell, homelessness could be a status if it (1) has a cause remote in time 
from its condition, (2) is relatively permanent in duration, and (3) has great 
magnitude and significance in terms of human behavior and values.167  
Satisfaction of each factor may be reasonably debated, but chronic 
homelessness would seem to qualify in most instances. A person does not 
suddenly become chronically homeless. It is usually caused by a variety of 
economic, physical, and psychological factors having distant origins.168 
Homelessness also perpetuates itself because it creates barriers that make it 
hard to escape once someone becomes homeless.169 Thus, by the time it 
becomes chronic, homelessness may have attained a relatively permanent 
                                                 
164 Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 202–03 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(writing that homosexuality is no longer viewed as a disease or disorder, but it is 
nonetheless protected under Justice White’s analysis in Powell, because sexual orientation 
“may well form part of the very fiber of an individual’s personality.”); see generally 
Powell, 392 U.S. at 550 n.2 (White, J., concurring in result) (explaining his understanding 
of what constitutes “status”). 
165 Powell, 392 U.S. at 551 (White, J., concurring in result) (writing that the plight of 
homeless alcoholics may be more a “function of economic station than of disease, although 
the disease may lead to destitution and perpetuate that condition.”). The court in Johnson v. 
City of Dallas later referred to Justice White’s example of a homeless alcoholic who has no 
private place to drink as the “fusion of homelessness and status . . . .”  Johnson v. City of 
Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 348 (N.D. Texas 1994), rev’d in part, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 
1995), vacated in part, Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995). 
166 Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 257 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see, 
e.g., Baker v. State, 478 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (“The status of being 
unemployed or without visible means of support is not a sufficient ground for criminal 
sanctions.”) (citing cases); see also Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 907–08 (D. 
Colo. 1969).  Justice Jackson wrote in Edwards v. California that “‘[i]ndigence’ in itself is 
neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying them.  The mere state of being without 
funds is a neutral fact—constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color.”  Edwards 
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184–85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
167 Powell, 392 U.S. at 550 n.2 (White, J., concurring in result). 
168 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992), remanded for 
limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir.1994), and directed to undertake settlement 
discussions, 76 F.3d 1154 (1996). 
169 Id. at 1564. 
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duration.170 Homelessness arguably has great magnitude and significance in 
terms of human behavior and values because those who experience it suffer 
from unsafe and unsanitary living conditions that few would choose.171 
III. DOES THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE PROTECT 
CONDUCT DERIVED FROM STATUS? 
 In Lehr v. City of Sacramento, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California rejected the reasoning of the Jones majority that 
the Eighth Amendment extends protection to involuntary acts occasioned by 
status.172 It expressed concern that extension of the Jones majority’s 
reasoning “would potentially provide constitutional recourse to anyone 
convicted on the basis of conduct derivative of a condition he is allegedly 
‘powerless to change.’”173 For example, “[a] wide variety of sex offenders 
would be immune from punishment if they could show that their conduct was 
not voluntary but part of the pattern of a disease.”174 It explained that such 
reasoning would, in effect, establish a constitutional doctrine of criminal 
responsibility.175 The court in Lehr warned that constitutionalizing the 
involuntariness principle would require a court “to couch its own moral 
beliefs in constitutional terms and to substitute its own judgment as to the 
morality of the criminal law for that of the states.”176 
 The court acknowledged in Lehr that homelessness is a serious 
problem.177 It nonetheless found slippery slope concerns too great to hold that 
conduct derivative of status may not be criminalized.178 The court opined that 
it would be “dangerous bordering on irresponsible” to address the plight of 
                                                 
170 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development defines a chronically 
homeless individual as “an individual with a disability who has been continuously 
homeless for 1 year or more or has experienced at least four episodes of homelessness in 
the last 3 years where the combined length of time homeless in those occasions is at least 
12 months.”  CLAUDIA D. SOLARI, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF 
CMTY. PLANNING & DEV., THE 2016 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) 
TO CONGRESS (2017). 
171 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1563. 
172 Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1229–31 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
173 Id. at 1234; see also Hendrick v. Caldwell, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868, 887 (W.D. Va. 2017). 
174 Lehr, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1234 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1967) 
(Black, J., concurring)). 
175 Id. at 1233–34. 
176 Id. at 1234. 
177 Id. at 1231. 
178 See id. at 1231–34. 
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homelessness by constitutionalizing an involuntariness principle because of 
its potential ramifications across the entire field of criminal law.179 
 The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California in Ashbaucher v. City of Arcata similarly declined to adopt the 
reasoning of the Jones majority.180 It wrote that “[t]his issue whether the 
Eighth Amendment protects the homeless against laws that prohibit conduct 
that is impossible for a homeless person to avoid was not, however, presented 
in Powell and has not been decided by the Supreme Court.”181 It reasoned 
that the Marshall plurality in Powell expressly rejected the expansive 
conclusion reached by the Jones majority that the Robinson principle extends 
to conduct.182 In that court’s view, Powell “did not set forth a constitutional 
rule that involuntary conduct cannot be criminalized under Robinson . . . .”183 
The court questioned the validity of the involuntariness principle cobbled 
together by the Jones majority from the Fortas dissent and White concurrence 
in Powell.184 It instead asserted that only Powell did not foreclose the 
possibility “that an individual could challenge a statute punishing conduct 
that was compelled by a disease or otherwise involuntary under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause if he could make a greater showing of 
compulsion or involuntariness of the prohibited conduct than was shown in 
Powell.”185 However, it shared the concerns expressed in Joyce about “the 
ramifications of providing constitutional protection to any condition over 
which a showing could be made that the defendant had no control.”186 The 
court in Ashbaucher ultimately agreed with the holding in Lehr that Robinson 
and Powell did not extend the protection of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause to involuntary conduct derived from status.187 
 The outright rejection of Jones by lower courts in Lehr and 
Ashbaucher is no longer tenable in that circuit with the reaffirmation of Jones 
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Martin v. City of Boise.188 However, 
                                                 
179 See id. at 1234. 
180 Ashbaucher v. City of Arcata, No. 08-2840 MPH (NJV), 2010 WL 11211481, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2010).  





186 Id. at *9. 
187 Id. at *11. 
188 See Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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Martin leaves many questions unanswered.189 The Martin panel wrote that its 
“holding is a narrow one.”190 It purports not to “suggest that a jurisdiction 
with insufficient shelter can never criminalize the act of sleeping outside.”191 
 The United States District Court for the District of Oregon wrote in 
Anderson v. City of Portland that it understood the slippery slope concerns 
expressed in Lehr, and that court’s reluctance to extend blanket constitutional 
protection to involuntary acts derived from status.192 The court in Anderson 
nonetheless concluded that “it seems a reasonable proposition under the 
Eighth Amendment that homeless persons should not be subject to criminal 
prosecution for merely sleeping in public at any time of day.”193 It further 
explained that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against criminalizing 
status extends to involuntary conduct that does not threaten public health, 
safety, or welfare.194 The court wrote that the critical factor is whether, and 
to what degree, an ordinance “criminalizes ‘conduct that society has an 
interest in preventing.’”195 The Oregon District Court indicated in a 
subsequent Anderson ruling that public safety and sanitation may be 
sufficient governmental interests to support prohibitions against particular 
activities.196 
 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
took an approach in Johnson v. City of Dallas which is similar to the one 
taken in Anderson.197 The court in Johnson held that homeless persons cannot 
be prevented from performing certain life sustaining acts in public, such as 
eating, breathing, and sleeping, if they have nowhere else to go.198 However, 
it drew a distinction between innocent acts and those that a community has 
an interest in protecting against.199 Therefore, while the court acknowledged 
                                                 
189 See id. at 1048 n.8. 
190 Id. at 1048. 
191 Id. at 1048 n.8. 
192 Anderson v. City of Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *6 (D. Or. Jul. 
31, 2009). 
193 Id. 
194 See id. at *7. 
195 Id. (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1139 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rymer, 
J., dissenting)). 
196 See Anderson v. City of Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2011 WL 6130598, at *3–4 (D. Or. 
Dec. 7, 2011). 
197 See Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 346–51 (N.D. Texas 1994), rev’d in 
part, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated in part, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995). 
198 Id. at 350. 
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that homeless persons must consume nourishment, it nonetheless held that a 
city may prohibit individuals from rummaging through trash receptacles for 
food.200 The court in Johnson recognized that a line must be drawn 
somewhere because there should not be a “class of persons who are 
constitutionally immune from much of the criminal law.”201 
 It is uncertain where a line would be drawn if the Supreme Court 
extends Eighth Amendment protection to involuntary conduct derived from 
status. The court in Lehr opined that only minimal innocent activity like 
sitting, lying, or sleeping would be protected under the analysis of the Jones 
majority, and those activities could be criminalized when coupled with some 
sort of conduct like camping or obstructing pedestrian or vehicular traffic.202 
The United States District Court of the District of Idaho made a similar 
observation in Bell v. City of Boise that there is a difference between a 
“complete ban on innocent acts, such as sitting, lying, or sleeping in a public 
way at any time of day, and other ordinances that are directed toward conduct 
beyond merely being present in public places.”203 The Jones majority 
indicated that ordinances can avoid criminalizing status by “making an 
element of the crime some conduct in combination with sitting, lying, or 
sleeping in a state of homelessness.”204 It then proceeded to list examples that 
would ostensibly pass muster: (1) ordinances that prohibit standing or lying 
in a public way when it obstructs pedestrian or vehicle traffic, (2) ordinances 
that prohibit camping on any public property or right of way, (3) ordinances 
with safe harbor provisions that limit hours of enforcement and thereby 
provide times that homeless persons may sit, lie, or sleep, and (4) ordinances 
that prohibit sitting or lying in only certain designated zones.205 
 The United States District Court for the District of Oregon rejected a 
challenge to an anti-camping ordinance in O’Callaghan v. City of 
Portland.206 The court in O’Callaghan noted the Jones majority mentioned 
                                                 
200 Id. at 350. 
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202 Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1231–32 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
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Portland’s anti-camping ordinance as one that added a conduct element 
sufficient to survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny.207 The court wrote that 
such mention suggested that the Ninth Circuit would sustain the 
constitutionality of an anti-camping ordinance.208 The court in O’Callaghan 
also agreed with the court’s conclusion in Anderson that an ordinance 
prohibiting derivative conduct does not punish status if the prohibition is 
based on legitimate governmental interests of safety and sanitation.209 
 It is, however, unclear whether the Ninth Circuit would agree with the 
Oregon District Court’s reading of Jones. The district court denied a motion 
in O’Callaghan to declare Portland’s anti-camping ordinance facially 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.210  Days after deciding Martin 
v. City of Boise, the Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling and directed the district 
court to allow Mr. O’Callaghan to amend his complaint to include facts 
asserting an “as applied” challenge to the ordinance.211 The Ninth Circuit 
noted in an unpublished memorandum ruling that it had “recently held that a 
city ordinance prohibiting individuals from sleeping outside on public 
property may violate the Eighth Amendment when enforced against homeless 
individuals who have no access to alternative shelter.”212 It therefore appears 
that the Ninth Circuit may reject the notion that the conduct of homeless 
camping falls outside the purview of Jones and Martin. 
 The court in Martin agreed with the Jones majority “that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or 
condition if it is the unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.”213 
Like the Jones majority, the Martin panel recognized that some restrictions 
could survive constitutional scrutiny, writing: “Even where shelter is 
unavailable, an ordinance prohibiting sitting, lying, or sleeping outside at 
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particular times or in particular locations might well be constitutionally 
permissible. So, too, might an ordinance barring the obstruction of public 
rights of way or the erection of certain structures.”214 The examples of things 
that might be permissible in Jones and Martin are not particularly helpful by 
themselves because they are not definitive. The Martin panel gave additional 
guidance, however, beyond listing examples. It explained: “Whether some 
other ordinance is consistent with the Eighth Amendment will depend, as 
here, on whether it punishes a person for lacking the means to live out the 
‘universal and unavoidable consequences of being human’ in the way the 
ordinance prescribes.”215 
 The Supreme Court has not given clear guidance. The Marshall 
plurality in Powell drew a clear line between behavior and status.216 Justice 
Black added in concurrence on behalf of himself and the second Justice 
Harlan that Robinson explicitly refused to allow use of status, or a condition, 
as protection against criminal culpability for actual behavior.217 The dissent 
countered that Powell did not deal with responsibility for criminal acts and 
instead dealt with culpability for a mere condition.218 Justice White did not 
find preoccupation with labels to be fruitful.219 He would not condone 
punishing a chronic alcoholic for yielding to an irresistible urge that he could 
no longer control.220 In Justice White’s view, however, a person who has a 
condition can sometimes still be punished without violating the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause.221 He opined that a person can be punished for 
his or her condition if “volitional acts brought about the ‘condition’” and 
“those acts are sufficiently proximate to the ‘condition’ for it to be 
permissible to impose penal sanctions on the ‘condition.’”222 In other words, 
a narcotics addict could be punished for that addiction if it was the result of 
recent voluntary use of narcotics.223 In addition, a person suffering from a 
condition may nonetheless be punished for acts that could have been avoided 
                                                 
214 Id. at 1048 n.8 (citation omitted). 
215 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136, vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 
2007)). 
216 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1967) (Marshall, J.). 
217 Id. at 542 (Black, J., concurring). 
218 Id. at 559 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
219 Id. at 550 n.2 (White, J., concurring in result). 
220 Id. at 549–50. 
221 Id. at 550. 
222 Id. at 551 n.2. 
223 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 686–88 (1962) (White, J., dissenting).  
2019 CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW 27 
 
despite the condition.224 Justice White explained, “I cannot say that the 
chronic alcoholic who proves his disease and a compulsion to drink is 
shielded from conviction when he has knowingly failed to take feasible 
precautions against committing a criminal act . . . .”225 Any effort to 
reassemble these disparate opinions into a majority view entails a strained 
exercise.226 
 The Eighth Amendment may be the wrong platform upon which to 
build constitutional protection for conduct. Its protection of status dates back 
only to Robinson and lacks any significant historical development upon 
which to base a limiting principle.227 Until Weems, the Supreme Court 
addressed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only to methods of 
punishment.228 There are good arguments that extension of Robinson to acts 
derived from status opens a Pandora’s box of unwanted applications that 
might excuse abhorrent conduct allegedly attributable to an uncontrollable 
compulsion caused by an illness or disease.229 This does not, however, mean 
that state and local governments should be or are allowed to punish innocent 
conduct. 
 The second Justice Harlan disagreed with the majority’s application 
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in Robinson, but he 
nonetheless concurred on the basis that the statute in question, as construed, 
constituted “an arbitrary imposition which exceeds the power that a State may 
exercise in enacting its criminal law.”230 Justice Harlan’s view merits 
additional consideration. The United States Supreme Court has long 
recognized that “[t]he police power is subject to the constitutional limitation 
that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably.”231  Those limitations 
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may provide a better analytical foundation for protection of innocent conduct.  
The Washington State Supreme Court explained in City of Seattle v. Pullman 
that an ordinance which makes no distinction between harmful conduct and 
essentially innocent conduct is an unreasonable exercise of police power.232 
 The New York Court of Appeals in Fenster v. Leary characterized 
vagrancy as a status crime and recognized that a statute could not stand under 
Robinson if it made criminal a condition over which an accused has no 
control, but it held that the conditions of vagrancy did not appear to directly 
involve the constitutional problem encountered in Robinson.233 The court, 
nonetheless, invalidated a vagrancy law as an improper exercise of police 
power because it was obvious that:  
The only persons arrested and prosecuted as common-law 
vagrants are alcoholic derelicts and other unfortunates, whose 
only crime, if any, is against themselves, and whose main 
offense usually consists in their leaving the environs of skid 
row and disturbing by their presence the sensibilities of 
residents of nicer parts of the community . . . .234 
The Fenster court further explained: 
[A] statute whose effect is to curtail the liberty of individuals 
to live their lives as they would and whose justification is 
claimed to lie in the exercise of the police power of the State 
must bear a reasonable relationship to, some proportion to, the 
alleged public good on account of which this restriction on 
individual liberty would be justified.235 
The court concluded that there was no reasonable relationship between public 
good and punishment of vagrants, and that the vagrancy law constituted: 
[A]n overreaching of the proper limitations of the police 
power in that it unreasonably makes criminal and provides 
punishment for conduct (if we can call idleness conduct) of an 
individual which in no way impinges on the rights or interests 
of others and which has in no way been demonstrated to have 
anything more than the most tenuous connection with 
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prevention of crime and preservation of the public order . . .236 
 The courts in Johnson v. City of Dallas and Anderson v. City of 
Portland supplemented their inquiry into questions of status with 
considerations traditionally addressed under the auspices of whether an 
exercise of police power was reasonable.237 Each court expressed concern 
that inquiry solely into the involuntariness of prohibited conduct was 
insufficient.238 As the court in Johnson recognized, “[i]f one’s homeless 
status entitled one to evade prosecution for removing waste from trash 
receptacles in order to find something to eat or wear, it is not difficult to 
rationalize constitutional protection for stealing food or clothing.”239 The 
addition of traditional police power considerations to Eighth Amendment 
analysis was necessitated by extension of the Robinson principle to protect 
conduct.240 When considering the admonition in Ingraham that the Robinson 
principle should be applied sparingly, it is conceivable that the Supreme 
Court might ultimately opt against extending Robinson to acts derived from 
status and instead leave questions regarding the scope of constitutional 
protection afforded conduct to traditional police power analysis.241 
IV. WHEN ARE PUBLIC SUBSISTENCE ACTIVITIES UNAVOIDABLE? 
 The extension of the Robinson principle to involuntary acts derived 
from status raises issues regarding whether particular conduct is avoidable.242 
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The Ninth Circuit wrote in Martin v. City of Boise that “[n]aturally, our 
holding does not cover individuals who do have access to adequate temporary 
shelter, whether because they have the means to pay for it or because it is 
realistically available to them for free, but who choose not to use it.”243 It did 
not, however, enunciate a standard by which it may be determined whether 
an individual has means to pay for shelter or has chosen not to use available 
shelter.244 
 The Eleventh Circuit in Joel v. City of Orlando rejected an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to an anti-camping ordinance because other 
alternatives were available to homeless persons.245  The court explained that 
Pottinger and Johnson both explicitly relied upon lack of shelter space when 
determining that prohibitions against sleeping in public unconstitutionally 
punished involuntary conduct.246 It therefore found the reasoning of those 
cases distinguishable in instances where alternative shelter is available.247 
The Joel court wrote that the availability of shelter space provides an 
opportunity for homeless persons to comply with a ban against camping in 
public places, and such a prohibition, therefore, does not criminalize 
involuntary behavior or punish status.248 
 The Idaho District Court in Bell v. City of Boise similarly held that an 
anti-camping ordinance does not criminalize homelessness if viable shelter 
options are available.249 In that case, the court determined that city parks 
provided an adequate safe harbor where homeless persons could sit, lie down, 
and sleep during the day.250 It further held that a city directive to suspend 
enforcement of the ordinance at night when shelter space was unavailable 
reasonably ensured that homeless persons were not being punished for 
status.251 The adequacy of the safe harbors identified in Bell are, however, 
questionable in light of Martin v. City of Boise.252 The Martin panel 
commented upon and disapproved of Boise’s enforcement of its anti-camping 
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ordinance against persons who slept in city parks with rudimentary 
precautions to protect themselves against the elements.253 It was also critical 
of Boise’s enforcement suspension policies because the panel determined that 
enforcement action was taken against individuals when shelter space may 
have been generally available but was functionally unavailable to them.254 
 The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California emphasized in Cobine v. City of Eureka that the majority in Jones 
determined the homeless individuals in that case had no choice but to be 
present on public streets and sidewalks because the number of homeless 
persons vastly outnumbered the amount of shelter beds and low income 
housing available in Los Angeles.255 It found such unavailability 
determinative of whether someone was voluntarily in a public space.256 Thus, 
the court concluded that an anti-camping ordinance would not be found to 
criminalize involuntary conduct resulting from homelessness if there is 
available and adequate shelter space.257 It further explained in Drake v. 
County of Sonoma: 
There is a strong argument that the Eighth Amendment (and 
perhaps also the Due Process Clause) precludes the 
government from enforcing an anti-camping ordinance 
against homeless people when it has no shelter available for 
them.  Moreover, the common assumption that it's enough for 
the government simply to make temporary shelter beds 
available is likely wrong. Even if shelter beds are available, 
the ability of the government to take enforcement action 
against homeless people who are camping should depend on 
the adequacy of conditions in the shelters. This is a particular 
concern for people with disabilities, who sometimes struggle 
to see their needs met in temporary shelters. And after all, 
many homeless people have disabilities.258 
 Decisions have focused upon whether shelter space is available.259 
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However, general availability of shelter space may not constitute access to 
adequate temporary shelter. The panel in Martin found that shelter’s religious 
requirements and stay duration limitations functionally limited access, and in 
such situations made no viable shelter available.260 The court in Drake noted 
that a shelter may be inadequate to meet the needs of a disabled homeless 
person.261 The court in Anderson indicated that an Eighth Amendment claim 
may be stated if “homeless people cannot access shelters based on physical 
disabilities, mental illness, or other factors.”262 The courts in Bell and Cobine 
each adopted a two-part inquiry: (1) is there sufficient shelter space?; and (2) 
is the available space a viable option?263 Therefore, the question of whether 
certain activities are involuntary or unavoidable may require a case-by-case 
individualized determination.264 
CONCLUSION 
 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment has three components: (1) it limits the types of punishments that 
can be imposed; (2) it prohibits punishments that are grossly disproportionate 
to the severity of the crime committed; and (3) it imposes substantive limits 
on what can be made a crime.265 The Supreme Court recognized in Robinson 
v. California that this third component of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause prevents punishment on the basis of status.266 The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held in Jones v. City of Los Angeles that the prohibition against 
status crimes protects homeless persons from being punished for acts that 
they are powerless to avoid.267 It therefore concluded that a local ban against 
sitting, lying, and sleeping in public areas violates the rights of homeless 
persons when other alternatives are unavailable because they cannot avoid 
engaging in such activities.268 The precedential value of Jones became 
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uncertain when the Ninth Circuit later vacated Jones after the parties settled. 
However, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to Jones in Martin v. 
City of Boise.269 
 Some courts have expressed skepticism about whether homelessness 
constitutes a status.270 It is, however, hard to see how drug addiction could be 
considered a status, as it was in Robinson, but homelessness would not.271 
Under the analytical framework provided by Justice White in Powell v. 
Texas, homelessness would constitute a status if (1) it has a cause remote 
from its condition, (2) its duration is relatively permanent, and (3) it has great 
magnitude and significance in terms of human behavior and values.272 
Chronic homelessness would seem to qualify because it is usually caused by 
a variety of remote factors, it is difficult to escape, and it forces those who 
suffer it to live in conditions few would choose.273 
 The Ninth Circuit held in Jones and Martin that a city cannot 
criminalize unavoidable acts that are an integral part of a person’s homeless 
status.274 If the Robinson principle is extended by the Supreme Court to 
protect involuntary acts, questions arise regarding when conduct will be 
considered constitutionally unavoidable.275 Jones, Martin, and other cases 
have emphasized the lack of other options when ruling that involuntary acts 
derived from homeless status may not be criminalized.276 The Eleventh 
Circuit rejected a challenge to an anti-camping ordinance in Joel v. City of 
Orlando because homeless persons had other available options.277 However, 
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a generally available option may be inadequate if it is functionally 
unavailable to a particular homeless person.278 The question may be two-fold: 
(1) are other options available?; and (2) are those options viable for the 
homeless person whose acts are at issue?279 
 The Supreme Court may ultimately decide that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause does not immunize actions of homeless persons from 
being criminalized.  The Marshall plurality in Powell warned that extension 
of Robinson to conduct would create an unbounded principle with negative 
repercussions across the field of criminal law.280 Other courts have expressed 
similar concerns.281  Some courts have attempted to address such concerns 
by adding a requirement that conduct must be both involuntary and innocent 
before it is entitled to Eighth Amendment protection.282 This supplementation 
is clearly needed to avoid potentially catastrophic over-application of the 
Robinson principle,283 but constitutional limitations upon the exercise of 
police power already protect innocent conduct from being criminalized.284 
Extension of the Robinson principle to conduct may, therefore, be 
unnecessary and ultimately undesired by the Supreme Court in light of its 
admonition in Ingraham v. Wright that the Robinson principle should be 
sparingly applied.285 However, the Ninth Circuit holds, and the DOJ has 
agreed, that substantive limits imposed by the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause prevent imposition of criminal penalties 
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against homeless persons for engaging in subsistence activities in public 
when other adequate options are unavailable to them.286 
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